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An Examination of the Treaties Governing 
The Far-Eastern Sino-Soviet Border 
in light of 
The Unequal Treaties Doctrine 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The boundary between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, spanning over 4,150 miles, is the longest two-nation 
border in existence.! It is also the most heavily fortified. 2 Despite the area's 
originally sparse population, the border has served as the backdrop for con-
frontation between Russia and China since the seventeenth century. 3 In con-
trast, for a brief period immediately following the Communist Chinese 
Revolution,4 Manchuria was cited as an example of Sino-Soviet cooperation. 5 
1. T.S. AN, THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as AN); D. 
WHITAKER & R.S. SHINN, AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 12 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as AREA HANDBOOK). A map of the Sino-Soviet border appears in the Appen-
dix to this article. 
2. About twenty-five percent of the Soviet Union's military strength has been deployed along 
the Sino-Soviet border. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 25, 1978-Jan. 1, 1979, at 47,49 
(Interview with Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs); Heighten Our Vigilance and eet Prepared to Fight a War, PEKING REV .. Aug. 11, 1978, at 5, 8. 
U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China and the gradual relaxation of European reluc-
tance to sell China military hardware may serve to equalize the presently overwhelming Soviet 
superiority along the frontier. Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping' s January 1979 visit to the 
United States following normalization was to have included consideration of comparative Sino-
Soviet military strength. See China's Military ProbltmJ on Two Fronts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1979, § 
1, at 12, col. 1; Russia os. China: Strugglefor Asia, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 27, 1979, at 
27, 30. China has exhibited an historic concern for the defense of the far-eastern border. See M. 
LOEWE, IMPERIAL CHINA 23, 255 (1965). 
3. AN. supra note 1, at 13. This Comment will deal specifically with the far-eastern or "Man-
churian" section of the border between the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) and the People's Republic 
of China (P.R.C.) 
4. The Chinese Communist Revolution culminated in the founding of the P.R.C. in October, 
1949. 
5. O. BORISOV & B. KOLOSKOV, SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS 1945-1970, at 326, 327 (1975) 
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On March 8, 1963, the People's Republic of China charged that the two 
major treaties governing the far-eastern Sino-Soviet border were "unequal 
treaties" and that a renegotiation of the frontier was necessary. 6 Six years later 
Chinese and Soviet soldiers engaged in armed conflict over Chenpao (Daman-
sky) Island on the frozen Ussuri River. 7 The border issue resurfaced again in 
1978, further illuminating the vast schism between the two nations. s Nearly a 
decade after the U ssuri River incidents, the February 17, 1979 Chinese inva-
sion of Vietnam dramatically heightened tension along the entire Sino-Soviet 
border. 9 The "far-eastern" or "Manchurian" section of the Sino-Soviet 
[hereinafter cited as BORlSOV]. The P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. agreed in August 1956 to com-
mence research to develop the Amur and Argun River regions for mutual use. /d. at 100. A great 
deal oftechnical assistance was rendered by the Soviet Union in the restoration of Manchuria, id. 
at 52-62, although the Soviets managed to convert much of Manchuria's industrial wealth to 
their own use. A METAXAS, Moscow OR PEKING 41 (Folliot trans. 1961); g. E. CARMAN, SOVIET 
IMPERIALISM 92, 93 (1950); see also Tang, Sino-Soviet Border Regions and their Changing Character, in 
UNITY AND CONTRADICTION: MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP 270 (K. Lon-
don ed. 1962). See generally Long Live the Great Sino-Soviet Alliance - Powerful Bulwark oj World Peace, 
Jen-min jih-pao LJ.M.J.P.] (People's Daily), editorial, Feb. 14, 1960, translated in SINO-SOVIET 
ALLIANCE-MIGHTY BULWARK OF WORLD PEACE 42 (1960). 
6. A Comment on the Statement oj the Communist Party ojthe U.S.A., J.M.J.P., Mar. 8,1963, at 1, 
translated in PEKING REV" Mar. 15, 1963, at 58. 
7. Several clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops occurred in March 1969 over one of the 
hundreds of islands in the U ssuri River. The gradual shifting of the thalweg has served to change 
the territorial status of certain river islands over time. AN, supra note 1, at 93. For the Chinese 
version of the border incidents, see Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Down With The 
New Tsars (1969). A Soviet view is contained in BORISOv, supra note 5, at 327-32. 
8. On February 24, 1978 the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet sent a letter to the 
Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Congress suggesting that the Soviet Union and the 
P.R.C. issue a "Joint Statement of Mutual Relations." The Chinese Foreign Ministry's reply, 
dated March 9, 1978, rejected this proposal, asserting that the Soviets had failed to implement a 
September, 1969 understanding between Chinese Premier Chou En-Iai and Alexei Kosygin, 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. According to Peking, the understanding 
contained three elements: (a) an agreement that neither side would resort to armed conflict; (b) 
an agreement to maintain the status quo on the border; (c) an agreement on the withdrawal of 
armed forces from the immediate border area. Chinese Foreign Ministry's Note to the Soviet Embassy in 
China, PEKING REV., Mar. 31, 1978, at 17; see also Resolution on the Report ojthe Work oj the Govern-
ment Delivered at the Fifth National People's Congress, adopted March 5, 1978, id., Mar. 10, 1978, at 8, 
39. The Soviets deny that this understanding represents anything more than a documentation of 
the Chinese position. "The Soviet side is in favor of the status quo, which it understands as the 
maintenance of the present border as ,ftxed by the Russian-Chinese treaty documents, while not 
denying - as already noted - the need for some adjustments. But the Chinese side links the 
status quo to the recognition of 'disputed areas' and a redrawing of the historically established 
border. Naturally, the Soviet Union cannot agree with this interpretation of the status quo." 
Pravda editorial, April 1, 1978, at 4-5, translated in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS 
[C.D.S.P.], April 26, 1978, at 1, 4. For the texts of both letters, see PEKING REV. , Mar. 31, 1978, 
at 17, 18. See generally R. TERRILL, THE FUTURE OF CHINA 210,211 (1978). The Soviet Union has 
admitted to Peking's accusation that on May 9, 1978 Soviet troops penetrated four kilometers in-
to Chinese territory. See Chinese Foreign Ministry's Oral Statement to the Soviet Ambassador, PEKING 
REV., May 26, 1978, at 20. 
9. China's February 17, 1979 attack against Vietnamese provinces along the Sino-Vietnamese 
border "raised the possibility of the ftrst clash between Soviet and Chinese forces since border 
ftghting along their frontier a decade ago. " Shipler, Soviet Terse in Invasion Report, Implying No Deci-
sion on Action, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1979, § 1, at 10, col. 5. The P.R.C. has consistently denied 
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border consists of approximately two-thousand miles of extremely varied ter-
rain. Although the entire far-eastern frontier has never been specifically 
delineated,IO the northeast corner of the Mongolian People's Republic marks 
the mountainous beginning of a natural line which terminates at the Pacific 
Ocean.l1 The frontier is generally defined by the Amur and its tributaries, 
running from the Argun to the Amur River and eventually following the 
U ssuri upstream. 12 
At the peak of the Han Dynasty (202 b.c.e.-220 c.e.) and several centuries 
later during the T'ang Dynasty (618-906 c.e.), the Chinese Empire controlled 
Southern Manchuria, Mongolia, Indo-China, Tibet, and Turkestan. 13 Dur-
ing the period of Mongol rule (1260-1368) Peking was established as the 
Chinese capitoF4 and Mongol influence spread across Asia into Russia. 15 In-
ternal political disorders and natural disasters led to the disintegration of the 
Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the founding of the Ming Dynasty in the middle of 
the fourteenth century. The Ming Dynasty was afflicted with similar prob-
lems, and in 1644 the Manchurian warriors captured Peking and established 
the Manchu (Ch'ing) Dynasty. 16 
In the early seventeenth century, Russian forces swept across Siberia en-
countering little resistance from the various tribal inhabitants of the region. 17 
any territorial ambitions in Vietnam, despite Peking's repeated suggestion that Sino-Vietnamese 
negotiations to restore peace should "proceed to settle the boundary and territorial disputes." 
Authorized Statement by Hsinhua News Agency - Chinese Frontier Troops Start Withdrawal, Mar. 5, 1979, 
reprinted in BEIJING REV., Mar. 9, 1979, at 12, see also Chinese Foreign Ministry's Note to Vietnamese 
Embassy, Mar. 1, 1979, reprinted in BEIJING REV., Mar. 9, 1979, at 13; On the Vietnamese Authorities 
Rejection of Negotiations, j.M.J.P., Feb. 27, 1979, translated in BEIJING REV., Mar. 2,1979, at 18, 
19; Memorandum on Vice-Premier LiXiannian's Talks with Premier Pham Van Dong, BEIJING REV., Mar. 
30, 1979, at 17. Vietnam appeared to suggest that talks on the restoration of normal relations 
could not include negotiation of boundary issues .. The Sino-Vietnamese frontier, according to 
Vietnam, is an "historical border that both sides have agreed to respect." Peking Sees Myth Ex-
ploded, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1969, § I, at 4, col. 4; see generally China Reported Planning to Keep Some 
Border Areas, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1979, § A, at 17, col. 1. The Sino-Vietnamese frontier is 
delineated by the Treaty of Peace and Commerce, june 9, 1885, China-France, [1908] 1 Herts-
lets China Treaties 296. 
10. W. A. D. JACKSON, THE RUSSO-CHINESE BORDERLANDS 23 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter 
cited as JACKSON]. 
11. F. WATSON, THE FRONTIERS OF CHINA 46 (1966) [hereinafter cited as WATSON]. 
12. /d. For a map of the border, see Appendix. The Soviet Union is currently engaged in the 
construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (B.A.M.), a 2,000 mile railroad line which will 
traverse Siberia from Lake Baikal to the Amur River. Aside from the obvious economic benefits, 
B.A.M. has great military implications for the frontier region. By the mid-1980's B.A.M. will 
allow the Soviet Union to supply its border troops without reliance on the Trans-Siberian 
Railroad, which lies close to the Sino-Soviet Border. See New Siberian Railway is to Speed Mineral 
and Oil Exploitation, Wall St. j., Feb. 8, 1979, at I, col. 1. 
13. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 38. 
14. AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 39. 
15. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 38-39. 
16. [d. at 39. 
17. W. BRAY, RUSSIAN FRONTIERS FROM Muscovy TO KHRUSHCHEV 47 (1963). 
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While Russia's territorial ambitions in Asia were held in check by the Manchu 
Dynasty until the nineteenth century, 18 the Chinese were unable to prevent 
Russian expeditions into the region and the establishment of numerous set-
tlements along the Lena, Kamchatka, Amur, and Ussuri Rivers.19 In 1643 
Russians reached the Amur basin. Six years later an ambitious advance down 
the Amur River precipitated a major confrontation with Manchurian 
soldiers.20 The Russian-Manchu conflict continued for several decades as the 
Tsarist forces established several major Amur fortifications including Ner-
chinsk (1656-58). Emperor K'ang-hsi finally crushed the anti-Manchu revolts 
plaguing South China in 1681 and proceeded to challenge the Russian sub-
jugation of the Tungu frontier peoples,21 It soon became apparent that the 
Tsarist forces had expanded the outposts far beyond the limited Russian sup-
ply capability. As a result, the Manchus were able to stop the Russian advance 
at N erchinsk in 1689. 22 
Any study of contemporary Sino-Soviet border relations must consider the 
fact that the present far-eastern frontier differs greatly from that of earlier 
times. In the years of the initial treaties governing this area, few ethnic Rus-
sians or Han Chinese were found on either side of the border. 23 Since then the 
Chinese Amur frontier, once inhabited by Tungusic tribes, has undergone ex-
tensive development. 24 On the Soviet side, major cities inhabited by non-
indigenous peoples have been developed. 25 
This Comment will examine the four boundary treaties relating to the Man-
churian Sino-Soviet frontier in light of the unequal treaties doctine as enun-
ciated by Soviet and Chinese jurists. 26 Initially the author will discuss the role 
of the "unequal treaties" concept in customary international law and the 
emergence of the socialist unequal treaties doctrine. Following a comparison 
18. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 39. 
19. E. THIEL, THE SOVIET FAR EAST 26-34 (Rookwood trans. 1957) [hereinafter cited as 
THIEL). 
20. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 40-41. Recall that the Manchus gained control of China only 
five years earlier in 1644. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
21. A. LAMB, ASIAN FRONTIERS 205 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LAMB). 
22. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 41. 
23. H. SCHWARTZ, TSARS, MANDARINS, AND COMMISSARS: A HISTORY OF CHINESE-RuSSIAN 
RELATIONS 14 (rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ). 
24. Much of this industrialization occurred during the japanese occupation of Manchuria 
during the Second World War. Set generally G. STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA: TO 1945, at 
417 (1969) [hereinafter cited as STEPHENSON); O.E. CLUBB, CHINESE COMMUNIST DEVELOP-
MENT PROGRAMS IN MANCHURIA (1954). 
25. LAMB, supra note 21, at 212; Set Mironenko, Population and Territorial Division, in HAND-
BOOK ISSUE ON SIBERIA AND THE SOVIET FAR EAST: INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OF THE SOVIET 
UNION 62 (1962); E.S. KIRBY, THE SOVIET FAR EAST (1971); THIEL, supra note 19. 
26. References and citations in this Comment have been limited to English-language sources 
and translations. It should be noted that the rapidly changing character of Sino-Soviet relations 
necessarily renders this Comment an ephemeral Quality. 
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of the Western and socialist concepts, the Sino-Russian treaties of Nerchinsk 
(1689), Kiakhta (1727), Aigun (1858), and Peking (1860) will be analyzed in 
an effort to determine the applicability of the unequal treaties doctrine accord-
ing to the available Soviet and Chinese criteria. The author proposes: (1) that 
the treaties of Aigun and Peking meet both the Soviet and Chinese criteria for 
invocation of the unequal treaties doctrine; (2) that the Treaty of Nerchinsk 
satisfies at least one of the two major elements of the doctrine;27 and (3) that 
the Treaty of Kiakhta cannot realistically be characterized as unequal. 28 An 
examination of the Soviet and Chinese positions regarding the validity of the 
border treaties will conclude with an assessment of the prospects for resolution 
of the Sino-Soviet dispute over the far-eastern frontier. 
II. THE UNEQUAL TREATIES CONCEPT IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Inequality and Duress in Customary Treaty Law 
The classical theorists of international law discussed the notion of unequal 
treaties only in passing. Interest in the theory of unequal treaties in interna-
tional law appeared to lapse for over a century and has only recently been 
revived with the emergence of the Soviet State. 29 Although the unequal 
treaties concept is not considered a formal doctrine of customary international 
law, a number of classical writers have differentiated between equal and un-
equal treaties. According to Wolff: 
Those treaties are unequal in which the same things or equivalents 
are not promised by each of the contracting parties .... Therefore, 
moreover, it follows that the condition of one of the contracting par-
ties is made worse by the treaty, or the conditions of those entering 
into an unequal treaty are not equal. 30 
Equality, however, is not essential to validity: "Treaties between nations are 
valid, if there is no inherent defect in the method of agreement, without con-
sideration of the equity or inequity of the treaty. "31 According to Grotius, 
27. The issue of the validity of the Treaty of Nerchinsk is moot, since the boundary provisions 
were later superceded by the Treaties of Aigun and Peking. 
28. Neither side has claimed that the Treaty of Kiakhta was unequal. 
29. H. CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 60 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as THE P.R.C. AND THE LAW OF TREATIES]. 
30. 2 C. VONWOLFF,jUS GENTIUMMETHODO SCIENTIFICAPERTRATATUM 206 (Drake trans. 
1934) [hereinafter cited as WOLFF.] 
31. ld. at 213. Wolff also noted that unequal treaties may impinge on a nation's sovereignty. 
[I]n an unequal treaty with diminution of sovereignty there is transferred to the more 
worthy ally either some sovereign right, or a right to single acts affecting the exercise of 
that right, and through this certain acts affecting the exercise of civil sovereignty are 
made dependent on the will of the more worthy ally, consequently there is a diminution 
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unequal treaties may be found not only between warring States, but also be-
tween States of greater and lesser power. 32 Pufendorf s definition of unequal 
treaties is similar to that offered by Grotius. 33 
Vat tel admonished that nations "should make their treaties equal, as far as 
that is possible.' '34 The natural law requires that treaties be based on equality 
unless special circumstances permit departure from the rule of equality. 35 Cer-
tain unequal treaties, however, may conform to naturallaw. 36 Wheaton wrote 
that treaties obtained under duress are void, since freedom of consent is 
necessary for validity. 37 It is clear that Wheaton intended only a narrow ap-
plication, if any, of this exception: "On the other hand, the welfare of society 
requires that the engagements entered into by a nation under such duress as is 
implied by the defeat of its military forces, the distress of its people, and the 
occupation of its territories by an enemy, should be held binding .... "38 The 
twentieth century socialist writers have emphasized that inequality in treaties 
serves as a basis for unilateral abrogation or that unequal treaties are void ab 
initio. These positions have not been recognized in customary international 
law. 39 
of the sum total of the sovereignty on the part of the less worthy ally . . . . 
!d. at 210. Grotius asserted that "Conventions which add something beyond the rights based on 
the law of nature are either equal or unequal. Those are on equal terms which are of the same 
character on both sides ... " 1 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 394-95, 397 
(Kelsey trans. 1925) [hereinafter cited as GROTIUS]. Grotius refers to treaties of peace and equal 
treaties of alliance as typical equal treaties. 
32. GROTIUS, supra note 31, at 397. 
33. "Treaties are unequal when the things promised by the two parties are unequal, or when 
either party is made inferior to the other." S. PUFENOORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 
LIBRIOCTO 1332 (Oldfather trans. 1964). 
34. E. VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, ApPLIQUES A LA 
CONDUITEAuxAFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DESSOUVERAINS 165 (Fenwick trans. 1916) [hereinafter 
cited as VATTEL]. 
35. !d. Vattel asserts that every nation exercising self government is a sovereign. Therefore a 
State bound to another more powerful State by an unequal treaty or alliance, if the nation retains 
its sovereignty, must obey the law of nations in its international affairs. [d. at II. 
36. E.g., a stronger State may force a weaker State to cease construction of a highway which 
might threaten the former's territory in time of war. Acquiesence to a treaty necessary to the 
stronger State's safety may be legally obtained through coercion. [d. at 169. Wolff agrees that 
unequal treaties may not violate natural equity in certain cases. WOLFF, supra note 30, at 205. 
37. H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (Wilson ed. 1936) [hereinafter 
cited as WHEATON]. 
38. !d. at 285-86. 
39. While not even utilizing the term "unequal treaties," the Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties defines "duress" in terms of coercion of in-
dividuals signing or ratifying a treaty. Article 32 requires that a State obtain a declaratory in-
validation before an international tribunal before a treaty can be nullified. A State can, however, 
temporarily suspend its obligations under a treaty. 3 HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 663,664 (1935), reprinted in 29 AM. J. INT. L. SuPP. 1 (1935). Article 52 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties is identical to Article 49 of the International Law COlD mission 
Draft: "Article 52: Coercion of a State by Threat or Use of Force. A treaty is void if its conclusion 
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B. The Principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda 
The general rule of international law mandating the binding effect and con-
tinued validity of treaties is established by the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 40 
The presumption of binding effect and the fact that treaties must be observed 
in good faith flows directly from the binding force of international law. 41 The 
universality of the principle of pacta sunt servanda is reflected in Vattel' s Le Droit 
des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, Appliques a la Conduite awe Affaires des 
Nations et des Souverains: 
The faith of treaties, that firm and sincere determination, that in-
variable steadfastness in carrying out our promises, of which we 
make profession in a treaty, is therefore held to be sacred and in-
violate by Nations whose safety and peace it secures; and if States do 
not wish to be lacking in their duty to themselves they should brand 
with infamy whoever violates his word. 41 
has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." U.N. Doc. NConf. 39127 (1969); S. ROSENNE, 
LAW OF TREATIES, GUIDE TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 286 (1970) 
[hereinafter cited as ROSENNE]. Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has yet 
to receive the thirty-five ratifications necessary for entry into force, the Convention is generally 
viewed as a primary source of customary international treaty law. The International Court of 
Justice (I.C.].) has stated that "[T]here can be little doubt, as implied in the Charter of the 
United Nations and recognized in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
that under contemporary international law an agreement concluded under the threat or use of 
force is void." Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), (1973]I.C.J. 39. See Briggs, 
Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. 
INT. L. 51, 62 (1974); if. Advisory Opinion on Namimbia, (1971] I.C.]. 16,47, referring to the 
Vienna Convention provisions regarding termination due to breach. 
The traditional Western rule has been that treaties between nations are valid without regard to 
the equality or inequality of terms. WOLFF, supra note 30, at 213; accord 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTER· 
NATIONAL LAW 891 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM]; WHEATON, 
supra note 37, at 285; HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 381 (8th ed. 1924) Professor 
Brierly has chosen to depict coercive treaties not as a specific problem of treaty law, but rather as 
indicative ofa more general weakness in the international legal system. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS 318, 319 (6th ed. Waldock, 1963). 
40. The principle of pacta sunt servanda is exemplified by Article 26 of the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties: "ARTICLE 26: Pacta Sunt Servanda. Every treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39127 (1969); 
ROSENNE, supra note 39, at 196; see J. HSIUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
244 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HSIUNG]. See also Article 19 of the Law on the Procedure for the 
Conclusion, Execution, and Denunciation of International Treaties of the U.S.S.R., Law of 
Sept. I, 1978, [1978]28 Vedomosti SSSR 439, translated in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1115,1120 
(1978). Many "unequal" treaties may actually be voidable under customary doctrines regarding 
capacity, change of circumstances, duress, and the effect of peremptory norms of international 
law. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 594, 595 (2d ed. 1973) 
[hereinafter cited as BROWNLIE]. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
148 (5th ed. 1967). SeegenerallyT. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 26,127-28(1974); V. 
MAhAJAN, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 386-88 (5th ed. 1973); OPPENHEIM, supra note 39, at 
881; A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 206 (1961); M. SORENSON, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 127-28 (1968); I. TAMMEW, TREATY INTERPRETATION AND PRACTICAL REASON 32 
(1967); Bishop, General Course of Public Law, 115-11 RECUEIL DES COURS 151, 340 (1965). 
41. VATTEL, supra note 34, at 188. 
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Even critics of the natural law theses hold pacta sunt servanda to be the' 'source 
of all the law created by treaties.' '42 The concept has been accepted by both 
classical Chinese43 and SovietH writers. In practice, the unequal treaties doc-
trine45 and rebus sic stantibus46 operate as exceptions to the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. 47 
III. THE SOCIALIST UNEQUAL TREATIES 
DOCTRINE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. The Soviet Unequal Treaties Doctrine 
The Soviet Union, although affording recognition to the tenets of 
customary international law , considers treaties to be a more significant source 
of international law than most Western nations. 48 The pragmatic reason for 
this stance is a Soviet desire not to be bound by rules it had no voice in pro-
mulgating. 49 The People's Republic of China and other socialist nations, also 
fearing constraint from "bourgeois" customary international legal norms, 
have generally adopted this preference for treaties as a primary source of inter-
national law. 50 Soviet writers have offered differing views as to the origin of 
42. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 314 (3d ed. 1959). 
43. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (1964); see also 
Leng, Sovereignty within the Chinese Legal System, in SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 247 (rev. ed. 
Larson 1965). 
44. /d. at 335. 
45. See S III. A-C, infra. 
46. See note 79 infra. 
47. S. MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1977); P. JESSUP, A 
MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 150 (1958). 
48. "Proportionately, treaty norms presently occupy the principal place in international law 
as a result of the large growth in the number of international agreements." G. TUNKIN, THEORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (Butler trans. 1974) [hereinafter cited as THEORY OF INTERNA· 
TIONAL LAW]; T. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1935); Lissit-
zyn, Recent Soviet Literature On International Law, 11 AM. SLAVIC & EAST EUR. REV. 257, 260 
(1952). G. Tunkin has asserted that customary international law generally reflects the legal no-
tions of the dominant capitalist powers. The Soviets view the invocation of customary interna-
tionallegal principles as an attempt to force compliance with bourgeois legal norms. G. TUNKIN, 
DAS VOLKERRECHTDER GEGENWART 125, 126-27 (Wolf trans. 1963), excerpted in W. FRIEDMANN, 
O. LISSITZYN, & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 69 (1969). Soviet 
writers do recognize, however, certain customary international law doctrines. See Krylov, Les No-
tions Principales Du Droit Des Gens "La Doctrine Sovietique du Droit International, " 70- I RECUEIL DES 
COURS 441 (1947). 
49. R. ERICKSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE 28 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as ERICKSON]; see also W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 336, 337 (1964). J. Triska notes that Soviet treaty law is becoming increasingly 
similar to Western treaty law. The former Soviet emphasis on political and ideological treaties 
presented more frequent problems concerning unilateral termination. In a 1965 paper, Triska 
observed a new pragmatism producing more conservative trends in Soviet treaty law. Triska, 
Soviet Treaty Law: A Quantitative Analysis, in THE SOVIET IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 52, 64 
(Baade ed. 1965). 
50. THE P.R.C. AND THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 28, at 5. K'ung Meng proposes that 
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the doctrine. While 1. 1. Lukashuk proposes that the unequal treaties doctrine 
is a product of historical development , 51 other Soviet jurists have implied that 
the principle of unequal treaties is derived from the Preamble to the United 
Nations Charter, which promotes equality among nations. 52 Although there 
appears to be no precise definition of the term "unequal treaties," a number 
of characteristic elements are referred to in several Soviet publications con-
cerning international law. Talaleyev and Boyarshinov observed that unequal 
treaties infringe upon state sovereignty by submitting essentially domestic 
regions of the weaker party to foreign control. 53 
According to a Soviet textbook on international law: "Equal treaties are 
treaties concluded on the basis of equality of the parties, unequal treaties are 
those which do not fulfill this elementary requirement.' '54 Soviet jurist A. N. 
Talalayev defines illegal treaties under international law as manifestly un-
equal, coercive, and colonialist in nature. 55 Unequal treaties do not create 
reciprocal rights and obligations according to Lukashuk. 56 Other Soviet 
writers have referred to unequal treaties in terms of duress, often defining the 
customary international legal theory is integrally related to the interests of capitalist States at 
various stages of their development. Capitalist nations continued to deny the sovereignty of 
weaker nations as long as they dealt from a position of superior strength. Meng, A Criticism of the 
Theories of Capitalist International Law on International Entities and the Recognition of States, Kuo-chi 
wen-t'i yen-chiu, Feb. 3, 1960, cited in Ogden, Sovereignty and International Law: The Perspective of the 
P.R.C., 7 N.Y.U.]. INT'LL. & POL. 17 (1974). 
51. Lukashuk, The Soviet Union and International Treaties, 1959 SOVETSKII EZHEDGODNIK 
MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA (Soviet Y.B. Int'l L.) 45 [hereinafter cited as Soviet Y.B. Int'l L.], 
cited in ERICKSON, supra note 49, at 79. 
52. Statement by Ms. Zgurskaya (Ukranian S.S.R.), Sixth (Legal) Committee of the U.N. 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. AlC. 6/SR784/13 at 18 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Statement by 
Ms. Zgurskaya), cited in ERICKSON, supra note 49, at 79; U.N. CHARTER preamble. The equality 
of nations in the international community is considered by the Soviets to be a cardinal principle of 
international law. V.1. LISSOVSKI, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO 74 (2d ed., 1961), cited in B. 
RAMUNOO, THE (SOVIET) SOCIALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 n.306 (1964) 
[hereinafter cited as RAMUNOO). The principle of socialist equality transcends mere legal equality 
and strives for equality in fact. Shurshalov, Mezhdunarodno - Pravovye Printsipy Sotrudnichtstra Sot-
sialisticheskikh Gosudarstv, 7 Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo j Pravo [S.G.I.P.]100 (1962), cited in RAMUN-
00, supra at 94; U senko, Osnov1!Jle Mezhdunarodno - Pravovye Printsipy, 3 S.G .I.P. 17 (1958), cited in 
RAMUNOO, supra at 94; see also THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 7-9. 
53. Talalayev & Boyarshinov, Neravnopravnye Dogovory Kak Forma Uderzhaniia Kolonial'noi 
Zavisimost i Novykh Gosudarstv Azii i Afriki (U nequal Treaties as a Mode of Prolonging the Colonial 
Dependence of the New States of Asia and Africa), 1961 Soviet Y.B. Int'l L. 170 [hereinafter 
cited as UNEQUAL TREATIES AS A MODE OF PROLONGING COLONIAL DEPENDENCE], cited in F. 
NOZARI, UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 n.l (1971); see Vassilenko, State 
Sovereignty and International Law, 1971 Soviet Y.B. Int'l L. 79, cited in Malawer, Imposed Treaties in 
International Law, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L.]. 97 (1977). 
54. INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 (F. Kozhevnikov ed., D. Ogden trans. 1961). 
55. Talalayev, Codification of the International Law of Treaties, 1962 Soviet Y.B. Int'l L. 144, cited 
in ERICKSON, supra note 49, at 77. 
56. Lukashuk, S.S.S.R.: Mezhdunarodnye Dogovory, 1959 Soviet Y.B. Int'l L. 19, cited in J. 
TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES 44 (1962) [hereinafter 
cited as TRISKA & SLUSSER). 
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coercive element in terms of military, political, or even economic factors. 57 In 
a 1955 text on international law, Vladim 1. Lissovskii characterized unequal 
treaties as (a) treaties creating a unilateral obligation, or (b) treaties specifi-
cally or effectively subordinating one party to an unequal status. 58 Perhaps a 
better working definition is provided by Talalayev and Boyarshinov, who list 
certain characteristics of unequal treaties. They contend that unequal treaties: 
(a) constrain one party's exercise of sovereignty in foreign affairs; (b) 
unreasonably interfere with domestic jurisdiction; (c) depend on the legislative 
actions of one party; (d) do not create reciprocal rights and obligations be-
tween the parties; and (e) require unequal commitments from the parties. 59 
The same authors maintain that unequal treaties are not binding and may be 
abrogated unilaterally at any time by the oppressed party. 60 In the past, the 
Soviet Union has abrogated treaties concluded by the Tsarist government by 
invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus or the unequal treaties doctrine. 61 
57. Statement by Ms. Zgurskaya, supra note 52, ciltd in ERICKSON, supra note 49, at 78. 
58. V.1. LISSOVSKII, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO 228 (1955), cited in TRISKA & SLUSSER, supra 
note 56, at 422 n.33. 
59. UNEQUAL TREATIES AS A MODE OF PROWNGING DEPENDENCE, supra note 53, at 169-70, 
cited in W. FRIEDMANN, O. LISSITZYN, & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
334 (1969). 
60. !d. 
61. Following the October Revolution in 1917, "[T)he Soviet State broke completely and im-
mediately with the colonial policy of tsarism and repudiated all treaties ofTsarist Russia having a 
colonial, annexationist, unequal character." THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 
11. Included were the secret treaties the Tsarist government signed between February and Oc-
tober 1917. The Soviets immediately abrogated treaties that they asserted secured the profits of 
the capitalist landowners. Although the term "unequal treaties" is not used, the abrogation was 
not based on rebus sic stantibus. C. HILL, THE DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 31 (1934). Later references to this period by Soviet writers imply the use of the un-
equal treaties doctrine. See, e.g., THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 11-14. When 
rebus sic stantibus has been explicitly invoked, the general argument has been that the 1917 Revolu-
tion severed the continuity of all prior obligations. See, e.g., Decree of the Central Executive Com-
mittee of November 13, 1918 denouncing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: 
The Brest-Litovsk Treaty, a treaty of force and robbery, has fallen under the blow of 
the united German and Russian Proletarian Revolutionaries. The toiling masses of 
Russia ... freed by the German Revolution from the yoke of this predatory treaty dic-
tated by German militarism, are now called upon to decide their own fate. 
Sovetskii Soiuz v Bor'be za Mir 56, ciltd in T. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION ANDINTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 250 n.51 (1935). See also the Statement of the Soviet Government dated April 2, 
1924: 
There was never a general abrogation of all treaties concluded by Russia under the old 
regime or under the provisional government. It hardly follows, however, that all these 
treaties are susceptible of being reconfirmed. There wiJJ be occasion to examine this 
question for each State and for each treaty separately from the point of view of the 
clause rebus sic stantibus. 
Cited in C. HILL, THE DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1934). 
1979] UNEQUAL TREATIES DOCTRINE 455 
B. The Chinese Unequal Treaties Doctrine 
Although the Soviet and Chinese conceptions of the unequal treaties princi-
ple are similar,62 there is ample evidence to suggest that the Chinese doctrine 
of unequal treaties developed independently of both the Western and the 
Soviet concepts.63 Significant differences also exist in the application of the 
doctrine to treaties between other nations. 64 The term was orginally employed 
with reference to the many agreements signed by the Manchu dynasty under 
duress granting consular jurisdiction to Western powers in the late nineteenth 
century.65 One of the few available Chinese publications discussing unequal 
treaties provides a Marxist-Leninist differentiation between treaties based on 
principles of equality and those which are inherently unequal. Genuine 
agreements negotiated from respective positions of equality are to be honored, 
whereas those treaties concluded in the absence of sovereign equality are 
anathema to international law and without validity. 66 Unequal treaties 
62. Professor Hungdah Chiu has noted the similarity between the Chinese concept of unequal 
treaties and the views expressed in INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 (F. Kozhevnikov ed., D. Ogden 
trans. 1961). THE P.R.C. AND THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 29, at 62. 
63. It is notable that neither the Soviet Karakhan Declaration (Deputy People's Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs Leo Karakhan'sJuly 25, 1919 renunciation ofTsarist conquests in China) nor 
the Sino-Soviet Agreement on the General Principles for the Settlement of Questions Between the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (May 31, 1924) include the term "unequal 
treaties." The Soviets made infrequent use of the term prior to World War II, but Chinese 
references to unequal treaties are found in publications from the 1920's. Chiu, Comparison of the 
Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties, in CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNA· 
TIONAL LAW 243,247 a.A. Cohen ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Comparison of the Nationalist and 
Communist Views]. Professors Chiu and Cohen have asserted that the Nationalist Chinese coined 
the term in 1923. 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 1116 
a.A. Cohen & H. Chiu eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as PEOPLE'S CHINA]. 
64. Chinese writers have applied the unequal treaties doctrine not only to Chinese treaties, but 
to treaties between other nations as well. See, e.g., the article praising the abrogation of the" un-
equal" Panama Canal Treaty. New Victory for Panamanian People, PEKING REV., April 28, 1978, at 
11; Cheng, The Philippines: America's Show Window of Democracy in Asia, id., Feb. 5, 1965, at 21-22; 
see also HSIUNG, supra note 47, at 253. 
65. Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Views, supra note 63, at 243, 247; Keeton, Ex-
traterritoriality in International and Comparative Law, 72-1 RECUEIL DES COURS 287, 350-51 (1948). See 
generally C. C. TAO, LES TRAITES INEGAUX DE LA CHINE ET L' ATTITUDES DES PUISSANCES 64-70 
(1929); C.-L. HSIA, STUDIES IN CHINESE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 1-46 (1925). Some Westerners 
predicted that abrogation of the "unequal treaties" would drive away civilized f(Jreigners and 
that the Chinese would "sink into unrestrained barbarity and misery." R. GILBERT, THE UN· 
EQUAL TREATIES, CHINA AND THE FOREIGNER 241 (1929). 
66. The classical writers of Marxism-Leninism confirmed an important principle con-
cerning international treaties, namely, the genuine sovereign equality between all par-
ties concerned should become the foundation of international treaties . 
Consequently, in accordance with Marxism-Leninism, there are equal treaties and 
unequal treaties, and therefore, progressive mankind takes fundamentally different at-
titudes towards different kinds of treaties. Equal treaties should be strictly observed. 
Unt:<jual treaties are in violation of international law and without legal validity. 
WANG Y. -T., Kuo-chi mao-yi t'iao-yueh ho hsieh-ting (International Trade Treaties and Agreements) 
10 (1958) [hereinafter cited as International Trade Treaties J, translated III 2 PEOPLE'S CHI:\A, supra 
note 63, at 1118-20. 
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"undermine the most fundamental principles of international law - such as 
the principle of sovereignty - therefore they are illegal and void. "67 Wang 
Y ao-t' ien indicates that the Chinese legal concept of equality in treaty-making 
transcends the language of the document involved and is based on the 
economic and political character of the signatory nations' relationship.68 Like 
the Soviet writers, contemporary Chinese theorists consider lack of equality 
between the bargaining parties in negotiations to be a characteristic of unequal 
treaties. 69 Chinese jurists also view nonreciprocity of treaty terms and obliga-
tions as determinative of an agreement's equality or inequality. 70 
C. The Socialist Unequal Treaties Doctrine as a 
Basis for Abrogation of Treaties 
Although Soviet and Chinese writers have apparently failed to provide a 
detailed framework for the application of the unequal treaties doctrine, 
socialist writers generally agree that unequal treaties are' 'in conflict with the 
peremptory principles of international law so that there are no legal obliga-
tions for their performance. "71 This is a major divergence from the Western 
view, which supports the continued validity of such agreements without 
regard to equality. 72 According to the Soviet view of international law, un-
67. Shih Sung, Yu Ta-tfsin, Lu Ying-Lui & Ts'ao K'o, An Initial Investigation into the Old Law 
Viewpoint in the Teaching of International Law, 4 Chiao-hsueh yii yen-chiu (Teaching and Research) 
14 (1958) cited in THE P.R.C. AND THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 28, at 62. 
68. International Trade Treaties, supra note 66, at 31, translated in 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra 
note 63, at 1118. 
69. G. SCOlT, CHINESE TREATIES 90 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CHINESE TREATIES); Interna-
tional Trade Treaties, supra note 66, at 9, 10, translated in 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 63, 
1118-20. 
70. CHINESE TREATIES, supra note 69, at 90, 92; see also U'hy the Tripartite Treaty does onry harm 
and brings no benefits, J.MJ.P., Aug. 10, 1963, translated in PEKING REV., Aug. 16, 1963; Interna-
tional Trade Treaties, supra note 66, at 9, 10, translated in 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 63, at 
1118-20. 
71. G. HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 157, 158 (1973). 
72. See note 39 supra. The strong preference for continued validity is expressed in Article 42 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Article 42: Validity and Continuance in Force of Treaties 
1. The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be 
impeached only through the application of the present Convention. 
2. The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal ofa party, may take 
place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present 
Convention. The same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty. 
U.N. Doc. NConf. 39127 (1969); ROSENNE, supra note 39, at 250. Brownlie notes the distinction 
between those articles of the Vienna Convention rendering a treaty voidable and those which ac-
tually void a treaty. The latter category includes coercion ofa representative ofa State (Art. 51), 
coercion of a State (Art. 52), and conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law 
(jus cogens) (Art. 53). The former group includes the following grounds for claiming the invalidity 
of a treaty: incompetence under internal law to conclude treaties (Art. 46); restrictions on 
representatives' authority to consent (Art. 47); error (Art. 48); fraud (Art. 49); and corruption of 
a representative (Art. 50). The following grounds for termination also result in voidability: 
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equal treaties are not protected by pacta sunt servanda73 and are invalid per se.74 
Therefore, signatory nations need not consider themselves bound by unequal 
treaties. 75 This is true of any treaty which defies the peremptory principles of 
international law. 76 Zadorozhnyi wrote that "Lenin maintained that unequal 
coercive treaties contradicted international law and were not subject to im-
plementation."77 To assert the validity of such a treaty would be 
reactionary. 78 
The Nationalist Government on mainland China (prior to 1949) adopted 
the customary view of treaty termination based on rebus sic stanibus79 and suc-
breach (Art. 60); impossibility (Art. 61); and fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stan-
tibus) (Art. 62). Note further that Article 44, relating to separability, does not apply to void 
treaties (Art. 51, 52, and 53). BROWNLIE. supra note 39, at 600; see generally Rosenne, Bilateralism 
and Communiry Interest in the Codified Law of Treaties, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING So-
CIETY202, 217 (W. FRIEDMANN, L. HENKIN, & O. LISSITZYNeds. 1972). 
73. Krylov, Les Notions Principales du Droit des Gens "La Doctrine Sovietique du Droit International, " 
70-I RECUEIL DES COURS 434 (1947). Soviet jurists have consistently supported unilateral denun-
ciation of treaties as a remedy for breach by the other party. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 279-81 (F. 
Kozhevnikov ed., D. Ogden trans. 1961); Set also B. SINHA, UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION OF 
TREATY BECAUSE OF PRIOR VIOLATIONS OF OBLIGATIONS BY THE OTHER PARTY 79 (1966). 
74. See note 47 supra. 
75. UNEQUAL TREATIES AS A MODE OF PROLONGING DEPENDENCE, supra note 53 cited in 
RAMUNOO, supra note 52, at 87-88 n.308. See generally A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TER-
MINATION 301-6 (1975). 
76. G. TUNKIN, VOPROSY TEORII MEZHDUNARODNOE PRA VA (Theoretical Questions ofInter-
national Law) (1962), cited in ERICKSON, supra note 49, at 86. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties provides a definition of a peremptory norm of international law: 
Article 53: Treaties Conflicting With A Peremptory Norm of General International 
Law (jus cogens) 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law hav-
ing the same character. 
U.N. Doc. AlConf. 39127 (1969); ROSENNE, supra note 39, at 290. Article 64 permits retroactive 
invalidation of treaties conflicting with new peremptory norms: "Article 64: Emergence of A 
New Peremptory Norm of General International Law (jus cogens). If a new peremptory norm of 
general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm 
becomes void and terminates." U.N. Doc. AlConf. 39127 (1969); ROSENNE, supra note 39, at 
330. The Soviet Union voiced strong support for the International Law Commission Draft 
Articles on international jus cogens, asserting that only treaties conforming to peremptory norms 
could have legal force. Schwelb, Some Aspects of IntemationalJus Cogens as Formulated by the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 946,961 (1967). Soviet writers confirm that treaties 
must conform to fundamental international legal principles. See, e.g., MEZHDUNARODNOEPRAVO 
PEREKHODNOVO VREMENI16 (Korovin ed. 1924) [hereinafter cited as Korovin]; N. MINASIAN, 
ISTOCHNIKI SOVREMENNOGO MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRA VA 48 (1960), both cited in THEORY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 155. 
77. Zadorozhnyi, Mezhdunarodno-pravovye sredstva mirnogo razresheniia mezhdunarodnykh sporov, in 
1951 MEZHDUNARODNOEPRAVO99 (Korovin ed., 1951) cited in TRISKA & SLUSSER, supra note 56, 
at 213. 
78. Id. at 100. 
79. The principle of rebus sic stantibus has been codified as Article 62 of the Vienna Convention 
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cessfully invoked the doctrine to abrogate unequal treaties granting consular 
jurisdiction. so Nationalist writers have generally adhered to the Western inter-
on the Law of Treaties. Note that § 2(a) precludes invocation of the doctrine to void a border 
treaty. 
Article 62: Fundamental Change of Circumstances 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those ex-
isting at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the par-
ties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty 
unless: 
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of 
the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be 
performed under the treaty. 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for ter-
minating or withdrawing from a treaty: 
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or 
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of 
an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other 
party by the treaty. 
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of cir-
cumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke 
the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty. 
U. N. Doc. A/Conf. 39127 (1969); ROSENNE, supra note 39, at 324; see also Haraszti, Treaties and the 
Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146-III RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 65-69 (1975). According to 
customary international law, rebus sic stantibus does not provide for immediate unilateral dissolu-
tion of treaties. The nation must first request that the other parties to the treaty release the nation 
from its obligations. OPPENHEIM, supra note 39, at 941. This approach is reflected in Article 65 of 
the Vienna Convention, which outlines the procedure for termination or invalidation of treaties. 
While the minority view that rebus sic stantibus can be invoked to void excessively burdensome 
treaty provisions has been roundly criticized, this interpretation may actually promote stability. 
See Lissitzyn, Stability and Change: Unilateral Denunciation or Suspension oj Treaties by Reason of Changed 
Circumstances, 61 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 186, 189 (1967); see generally VATTEL, supra note 34, at 
211; WHEATON, supra note 37, at 281; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 169-70 (5th ed. 1967). On the relationship between rebus sic stantibus and unequal treaties, 
see F. NOZARI, UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 134-65 (1971). 
80. E.g., the Sino-Belgian Treaty of November 2,1865. Article 46 of the Sino-Belgian Treaty 
granted Belgium a unilateral denunciation privilege. In a note to the Belgian Government dated 
April 16, 1926 China sought the negotiation of an "equal" treaty to replace the current agree-
ment: 
During the long period which has elapsed since its conclusion so many momentous 
political, social and commercial changes have taken place in both countries that, taking 
all circumstances into consideration, it is not only desirable but also essential to the 
mutual interest of both parties concerned, to have the said treaty revised and replaced 
by a new one to be mutually agreed upon. 
CHINA YEARBOOK 770 (1928). Note that rebus sic stantibus was not invoked by the Chinese to 
justify unilateral abrogation, but rather to require the renegotiation of treaty relations between 
China and Belgium: "the Chinese Government are [sic] endeavoring to revise the existing 
treaties which are as a rule terminable by notice after a certain period, so that all unequal and ab-
solute provisions may be omitted from the new treaties to be negotiated upon the expiration of the 
specified periods." Statement of the Chinese Government Explaining the Termination of the 
Sino-Belgian Treaty of November 2, 1865, in L. W. C. PU, STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE 
GOVERNMENT AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SINO-BELGIAN 
TREATY OF AMITY, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION OF NOVEMBER 2, 1865, at 2 (1926). On 
November 25, 1926 Belgium submitted a unilateral application to the Permanent Court ofInter-
national Justice (under Article 40 of the Statute); however China at all times refused to recognize 
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pretation of the effect of inequality on the validity of treaties. 81 Since the 
Revolution, the People's Republic of China has subscribed to the newer 
socialist interpretation of unequal treaties, permitting unilateral abrogation by 
the oppressed State without resort to any formal procedure. 82 Jurist Hsin Wu 
declared that treaties obtained through coercion cannot be afforded the same 
legitimacy granted treaties based on sovereign equality. 83 Accordingly, the 
the Court's jurisdiction in the matter. T. HUANG, THE DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS IN IN. 
TERNATIONAL LAW 77-79 (1935). China's continuing pressure on the Belgian Government even-
tually led to the renegotiation and conclusion of a new Sino-Belgian Treaty on November 22, 
'928. /d. at 79. See generally C. HILL, THE DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 32-33 (1934). More recently, the P.R.C. has applied the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus to the 
Sino-Burmese frontier question: 
At the same time we must bear in mind the fundamental changes of historical impor-
tance which have taken place in China and Burma respectively, i.e., China has cast 
away its semi-colonial status, and both have become independent and mutually friendly 
countries. The Burmese Government has succeeded to the territory formerly controlled 
by Britain, and the Union of Burma has been established by combining the various 
autonomous states and Burma proper, while our government has taken over the ter-
ritory under the jurisdiction of the Kuomintang government. In dealing with this 
boundary question, attention must be paid to these historical changes, and the treaties 
signed in the past which concern the boundary between China and Burma must be 
treated in accordance with general international practice. 
Statement by Premier Chou En-lai, Report on the Question of the Boundary Line Between 
China and Burma to the Fourth Session of the First National People's Congress, July 9,1957, 
translated in CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, A VICTORY FOR THE FIVE PRIN-
CIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (1960). 
81. E.g., a 1927 treatise acknowledges that coercion does not necessarily vitiate a treaty. 
Treaty validity requires, inter alia 
that the formal and free consent of the contracting parties is given. By freedom of con-
sent it does not imply that force, as by war, reprisals, or otherwise, may not be used in 
bringing about a condition of affairs which may lead a state, without parting with its in-
dependence and sovereignty, to make such sacrifices as may be necessary to put an end 
there to. 
L. C. YEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (1927). 
82. Compan'son of Nationalist and Communist Views, supra note 63, at 267. Some pre-1949 Chinese 
jurists apparently felt unilateral denunciation was possible under rebus sic stantibus. See, e.g., 
TSENG Y. H., THE TERMINATION OF UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (1933). 
Even traditional Chinese theorists found coercion a vitiating factor. According to Shao-chuan 
Leng, classical scholar Tso-Chuan alluded to the abrogation of treaties obtained through duress: 
"God does not require adherence to a forced covenant; it may be broken," Leng, Sovereignty 
within the Chinese Legal System, in SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 248 (Larson ed. 1965). 
83. In rejecting Professor Hyde's contention that treaties remain valid regardless of the 
motivation of the party ceding territory, Hsin Wu referred to the "unequal Treaty of 
Shimonoseki" : 
Obviously, according to such an interpretation, it was legitimate for Japan to force the 
Manchu Government of China to cede Taiwan and Penghu through the unequal 
Treaty of Shimonoseki after the 1895 Sino-J apanese War. This is tantamount to saying 
that it is legal for a robber to take property by brandishing a dagger before the owner, 
threatening his life, and then forcing him to put his fingerprint on a document in-
dicating his consent. Is that not absurd? No wonder bourgeois international law has 
sometimes been described as the law of bandits. 
Hsin, A Criticism of Bourgeois international Law on the Question of State Territory, 7 Kuo-chi wen-t'i yen-
chiu (Studies in International Problems) 44-51 (1960) translated in 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 
63, at 326. 
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position of the People's Republic of China is that unequal treaties may be ter-
minated by a victimized nation in disregard of the principle of pacta sunt ser-
vanda84 and without invocation of the doctrine of rebus si'c stantibus. 85 While 
China has unilaterally repudated certain treaties it considers unequal,86 
Peking has generally refrained from unilaterally abrogating unequal treaties 
governing boundaries pending renegotiation. 87 
D. A Comparison oj the Western and Socialist 
Views oj Unequal Treaties 
The socialist concept of unequal treaties is not unlike the Western attitude 
toward treaties obtained through coercion as expressed in Article 52 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 88 Both concepts provide a 
means of circumventing the pervasive principle of pacta sunt servanda. 89 Tradi-
tionally, coercion did not serve to render a treaty void per se. The standard 
argument raised against such a proposition is the potential invalidation of 
every peace treaty signed at the conclusion of armed conflict. 90 One major dif-
ference, however, is in the effect of the doctrine. While the Vienna Conven-
84. "The classical writers of Marxism-Leninism ... considered the international law princi-
ple of pacta sunt servanda not to be applicable to treaties involving aggression and 
slavery ... Refusal to perform this type of treaty should not be considered a violation of interna-
tionallaw." International Trade Treaties, supra note 66, at 10, translated in 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA, 
supra note 63, at 1118-19. Article 55 of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference, adopted by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference on September 29, 1949, grants the Chinese Government broad latitude 
to review and abrogate treaties concluded by prior governments: "ARTICLE 55. The Central 
People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall examine the treaties and 
agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign governments, and shall recognize, 
abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them according to their respective contents." CONSTITUTIONS OF 
THE COMMUNIST PARTy-STATES 101 U. Triska ed. 1968). The specific reference to the Kuomin-
tang has not prevented the P.R.C. from reviewing the treaties of governments prior to the 
Kuomintang. THEP.R.C. AND THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 29, at 93. 
85. THE P.R.C. AND THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 29, at 103. 
86. E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, United States-
China, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871. James Hsiung notes that although the P.R.C . has 
reserved the right to unilaterally abrogate treaties signed by the Nationalist Government, it has 
gOlle no further than ratification of the 1941 Nationalist abrogation of the 1895 Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of Shimonoseki. HSIUNG, supra note 47, at 247. 
87. L.T. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 21 (1969) Leng, The Sino-Soviet 
Dispute, in LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 271 (S.C. Leng & H. Chiu eds. 1972). 
88. See note 39, supra; see also, U. N. CHARTER art. 2(1). Note that the United Nations Charter 
reference to "sovereign equality" has not been interpreted to mandate absolute equality among 
nations. L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY AND 
DOCUMENTS 65 (1946); Elias, Problems Concerning the Validity of Treaties, 134 RECUEIL DES COURS 
332, 380-87 (1971). See generally P.H. KooI]MANS. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEGAL EQUALITY OF 
STATES (1964). 
89. Friedmann, General Course in Public International Law, 127-1I RECUEIL DES COURS 38, 196 
(1969). 
90. Malawer, Imposed Treaties and International Law, 7 CALIF. W. INT"LL.J. 163 (1977). 
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tion is intended to guide treaties only infuturo and have no retroactive applica-
tion, the socialist doctrine is applied retroactively so as to affect a nation's past 
treaties. 91 A second difference is the method of invalidation. Invocation of 
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention would require recourse to the formal 
notification, invalidation, and termination procedures of customary interna-
tionallaw as set forth in Articles 65 through 70. The socialist unequal treaties 
doctrine would permit a victimized state to unilaterally terminate an unequal 
treaty at will. Finally, Article 52 does not appear to subsume the broad justifi-
cation of inequality cited by socialist writers as support for the application of 
the unequal treaties doctrine. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Criteria 
Since there is no readily apparent consensus among Chinese and Soviet 
jurists concerning specific criteria as indicia of inequality in treaties,92 the 
characterization of a treaty as unequal is quite dependent on political con-
siderations. 93 Removed from the political context, the Chinese and Soviet 
writers previously mentioned94 have provided some indication of general fac-
tors to be considered in the analysis of treaty equality or inequality. For the 
purposes of this Comment, circumstances relating to the processes of negotia-
tion, conclusion, and ratification of treaties will be referred to as 
"procedural" factors. The actual terms and provisions of the treaty (bound-
aries, rights, etc.) will be referred to as the "substantive" aspect of the treaty-
making process. Both the Soviets95 and the Chinese96 consider procedural 
91. THE P.R.C. AND THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 29, at 62; Report of the International 
Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.7), U.N. Doc. 
A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted in [1966J 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm. 169, 246, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. 1 (1966). R.Y. Jennings asserts that Article 2(4) of the United Na-
tions Charter and Article 49 of the International Law Commission Final Draft Articles on the 
Law of Treaties (now Article 52) render the validity of treaties of cession under duress ques-
tionable. Note, however, that 
old titles by conquest, or by forced cession, must still be regarded as valid, unless indeed 
the rule of intertemporallaw is to be rejected, and there is neither authority nor reason 
for doing this. In particular cases, there mayor may not be political reasons why a title 
originating in conquest might politically be called in question; but this is a different 
matter. If old titles are to be dug up and examined against the contemporary rather 
than the intertemporallaw there can be few, if any, titles that will stand up. 
Jennings, General Course on Principles oj International Law, 121-11 RECUEIL DES COURS 327, 419 
(1967). This view is reflected in the Case Concerning the Temple ofPreah Vihear (Cambodia v. 
Thailand), [1962J I.C.]. 6, 34. 
92. Detter, tke Problem oj Unequal Treaties, 15 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 1069, 1086 (1966). 
93. THEP.R.C. AND THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 29, at 68; see text accompanying notes 
68-71 supra. 
94. See notes 48-70 supra and accompanying text. 
95. INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 (F. Kozhevnikov ed., D. Ogden trans. 1961). 
96. International Trade Treaties, supra note 66, at 10, translated in 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra 
note 63, at 1119. 
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equality as a major factor in determining the applicability of the doctrine. 97 
Each has broadened this concept from mere coercion of representatives (as in 
Article 51 of the Vienna Convention) to include the exertion of economic and 
political pressure against a nation. 98 Soviet theorist V. I. Lissovskii's defini-
tion of unequal treaties is phrased in terms of textual equality and reciprocity 
of obligations. 99 The Chinese government has made similar references to the 
lack of reciprocity inherent in unequal treaties. 100 Soviet and Chinese writers 
stress that inequality of obligations can render a treaty void ab initio under the 
unequal treaties doctrine. lol 
B. The Sino-Soviet Border Situation 
The Soviets have consistently denied that the treaties presently governing 
the far-eastern Sino-Soviet border are unequal, 102 while China has specifically 
charged that the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) are unequal and 
therefore invalid. l03 Although the dispute has rarely involved the Treaties of 
97. CHINESE TREATIES, supra note 69, at 90. 
98. !d.; see also Statement by Ms. Zgurskaya, supra note 52, cited in ERICKSON, supra note 49, at 
78; International Trade Treaties, supra note 66, at 27, 31, cited in Hsiao, Communist China's Trade 
Treaties and Agreements, 21 VAND. L. REV. 623, 650(1968). A number of African and Asian States 
have rejected the validity of treaties obtained through coercion. Treaties concluded by means of 
violence and threats of force are considered void. S. SINHA, NEW NATIONS AND THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 85 (1967); see generally Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of 
International Law, 15 INT'L. & COMPo L. Q. 55-75 (1966); Sinha, Perspective of the Newly Independent 
States on the Binding Quality of International Law, 14 INT'L. & COMPo L. Q. 122 (1965); Murphy, 
Economic Duress and Unequal Treaties, 11 VA. j. INT'L L. 51 (1970). 
99. V. I. LISSOVSKII, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO 228 (1955), cited in TRISKA & SLUSSER, supra 
note 56, at 422 n.33. 
100. CHINESE TREATIES, supra note 69, at 90, 92. 
101. Krylov, Les Notions Principales du Droit des Gens "La Doctrine Soveitique du Droit International, " 
70-1 RECUEIL DES COURS 434 (1947). Substantive equality has arisen as a major concern in a 
number of the P.R.C.'s bilateral treaties, such as the boundary agreements with Burma, Nepal, 
Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Pakistan. See L.T. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
34 (1969). 
102. At least one Soviet commentator has asserted that the Treaty of Nerchinsk was unequal, 
and that the subsequent treaties of Aigun and Peking served to return to Russia territory lost 
through the prior unequal treaty of Nerchinsk. Therefore, Aigun and Peking cannot be unequal 
treaties. See j. GITTINGS, SURVEY OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE 164, 165 (1968); see also 
Miasnikov, The Manchu Invasion of the Amur Valley and the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 6 CHINESE L. & 
GOV'T 22 (1974), cited in Malawer, Imposed Treaties and International Law, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L. j. 
100 (1977). Numerous Tass News Agency statements have illustrated the Soviet position, e.g.: 
"If states now begin to make territorial claims on one another, using as arguments some ancient 
data and the graves of their forefathers, if they start fighting for the revision of historically 
developed frontiers, this will lead to no good. .. "Statement of the Government of the 
U.S.S.R. (Sept. 20, 1963), reprinted in D. Dcx)LIN, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN THE SINO-SOVIET 
CONFLICT 32,13 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dcx)LIN]. 
103. See, e.g., A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., j.M.J.P. editorial, 
Mar. 8,1963, translated in PEKING REV., Mar. 15, 1963, at 58; Letter of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China of February 2.9, 1.964 to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
lJnion, PEKING REV., May 8, 1964, at 7. Information Dep't of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 
f::henpao Island Has Always Been Chinese Territory, reprinted in PEKING REV., Mar. a, 1969, at 
14 I hereinafter cited as Chenpao Island]. 
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Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta (1727), these treaties will also be examined in 
light of the unequal treaties doctrine. 
1. The Treaty of Nerchinsk 
A good argument can be advanced for the characterization of the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk as an unequal treaty based on purely procedural grounds. On a 
substantive level, however, there appears to have been relative reciprocity. 
The Treaty of Nerchinsk (August 1689) was China's first treaty with a Euro-
pean power. China ceded approximately 93,000 square miles of territoryl04 in 
exchange for the destruction of Tsarist settlements (ostrogs) in the Amur River 
Valley. 105 The Treaty boundary ran from the Argun and Amur Rivers to the 
mouth of the Kerbechi River, following the Kerbechi to the Hsing-an Moun-
tain Range, thence along the Yablonovoy and Stanovoy Mountains to the U d 
River. l06 Under the terms agreed to at Nerchinsk, no Russian expeditions 
would be allowed to construct settlements and fortifications in Manchuria 
beyond the Amur. Russian colonists already settled could choose to return to 
Russia or establish themselves as Chinese citizens. l07 In sum, the Russians ob-
tained China's acknowledgment of Russian sovereignty in Eastern Siberia. In 
exchange for this, the Manchu court had succeeded in stemming the advance 
of Tsarist imperialism in Manchuria. loB Procedurally, the Tsar's representa-
tives became signatories to the Treaty of Nerchinsk under substantial 
duress. 109 Manchu forces had attacked the fort at Albazin in 1685 and 1686 
nearly eradicating the Russian inhabitants.110 Additionally, the fact that the 
Chinese delegation outnumbered the Russian delegation 15,000 to 2,000 
proved decisive in the Treaty negotiations.!!! When negotiations had reached 
104. Treaty of Nerchinsk, October 1689, China-Russia, art. I, [1908J 1 Hertslet's China 
Treaties [H.C.T.) 437, (1969)18 Parry's T.S. 503; see Appendix. 
105. !d., art. II. Included in the posts to be destroyed was the significant Russian fortification 
at Albazin. [1908)1 H.C.T. 437, [1969]18 Parry's T.S. 503. 
106. Treaty of Nerchinsk, supra note 104, art. 1. The Ud Valley frontier was left undefined as 
neutral territory between the two empires. [1908]1 H.C.T. 437, [1969]18 Parry's T.S. 503. 
107. !d., art. II, V., [1908]1 H.C.T. 438, 439, [1969]18 Parry's T.S. 503. 
108. Following the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Chinese Government prevented both Han 
Chinese and Manchus from settling on the Russian frontier, presumably to hinder a potential 
Russian invasion. When the Russians later obtained sovereignty over the Amur Basin, fewer 
than 11,000 inhabitants remained. In the Ussuri region, only 2,000 inhabitants were discovered. 
M. PAVLOVSKY, CHINESE-RuSSIAN RELATIONS 39 (1949); K. WEIGH, RUSSO-CHINESE 
DIPLOMACY 23 (1928) [hereinafter cited as WEIGHJ. 
109. Other writers have argued that the Treaty of Nerchinsk was concluded under conditions 
of procedural equality. See, e.g., C.-L. HSIA, STUDIES IN CHINESE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 13 
(1925). 
110. SC"WARTZ, supra note 23, at 28,29. In response to the murder of twenty Chinese hunters 
by Russian Cossacks from Albazin in 1683, the Chinese Army destroyed the fort in 1685. The 
Russians rebuilt Albazin, and the Chinese attacked again in 1686, relenting upon the commence-
ment of negotiations with the Russians at Nerchinsk. WEIGH, supra note 108, at 10. 
111. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 29. 
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an impass, Manchu Prince San-go-to threatened an attack on Nerchinsk and 
Albazin, thereby pressuring Russian representative Fyedor Alekseyevich 
Golovin to accede to China's terms.112 
Although it could be argued that the Treaty of Nerchinsk was based on 
substantive reciprocity, there is little doubt that the conditions of duress sur-
rounding the negotiations place the Treaty within the unequal treaties doc-
trine as enunciated by both Chinese and Soviet jurists. 
2. The Treaty of Kiakhta 
The Treaty of Kiakhta, signed on October 21, 1727, established the frontier 
between Siberia and Mongolia. An examination of the circumstances sur-
rounding negotiations indicates that there was relative procedural and 
substantive equality, precluding the characterization of Kiakhta as an "un-
equal treaty." The border extended from the Sayan Mountains east to the 
Argun River.ll3 This effectively granted China control over both Inner and 
Outer Mongolia. 114 In return, the Manchus surrendered territory between the 
Sayan and Upper Irtysh Mountains, as well as the southern portion of Lake 
Baikal. This totalled some 40,000 square miles. 115 The agreement left the ter-
ritory west of the Bay of Ud undefinedl16 and also failed to delineate the 
western frontier. Both sides made significant substantive compromises in the 
Treaty of Kiakhta. China relinquished claims to significant sums of territory 
in exchange for Russian acknowledgment of Chinese jurisdiction over 
Mongolia. 117 In a procedural sense, the increasing Russian influence in the 
Manchurian region had forced the xenophobic Manchu Dynasty to negotiate 
with Russia on at least a temporary basis of equality. lIB The Manchu Dy-
nasty, however, was still able to bargain from a position of respectable 
strength. Consequently, neither side has contended that the Treaty of Kiakhta 
was unequal. 
112. [d. 
113. Treaty of Peace & Boundaries (Treaty of Kiakhta), Oct. 21, 1727, China-Russia, art. 
III, [1908]1 H.C.T. 440, [1969] 33 Parry's T.S. 23. The border west of the Argun River ran 
nearly directly northwest to the present Mongolian frontier. See Appendix. 
114. !d., art. III. Russia did reserve the right to send traders across Mongolia. [d., art. IV, 
[1908]1 H.C.T. 441, [1969] 33 Parry's T.S. 23. See AN, supra note 1, at 32. 
115. Treaty of Kiakhta, supra note 113, art. Ill, [1908]1 H.C.T. 440, [1969]33 Parry's T.S. 
23. See generally I. Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 155 (1970); JACKSON, supra note 10, at 138. 
116. Treaty of Kiakhta, supra note 113, art. III, [1908]1 H.C.T. 440, [1969]33 Parry's T.S. 
23. 
117. !d. The Treaty of Kiakhta also made provisions for the entry of Russian traders and the 
establishment ofa Tsarist mission in Peking. !d., art. IV, [1908]1 H.C.T. 44~, [1969]33 Parry's 
T.S. 23. Some writers have suggested that the Russian concessions exceeded those offered by the 
Chinese. M. PAVLOVSKY, CHINESE-RusSIAN RELATIONS 38 (rev. ed. 1973). 
118. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 38. 
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3. The Treaty of Aigun 
With the decline of Manchu power, the mid-nineteenth century saw 
Western nations race to carve the most advantageous slice of the Chinese 
melon. The Opium War only served to confirm Tsarist Russia's perception of 
a weakened China. During the time period between the Treaties of Kiakhta 
and Aigun, Imperial Russia managed to re-establish much of its power in the 
Amur Valley, in direct violation of the 1689 agreement at N erchinsk. 119 In 
1858 while representatives of the United States, Russia, France and Great 
Britain prepared for the treaty signing at Tientsin, Tsarist and Chinese en-
voys met in Manchuria at Aigun. The resulting Treaty of Aigun (May 1858) 
was obtained by Russian representative Nikolai Muraviev120 largely through 
the intimation of a possible British takeover of the Amur region. 121 Other pro-
cedural factors indicate that the Treaty was signed under substantial duress. 
Tsarist forces near Aigun comprised nearly 23,000 troops, most of them sta-
tioned along the Manchurian and Mongolian frontiers. 122 Direct pressure 
from the French and British, as well as the debilitating effect of the Taiping 
and Nienfei uprisings, played a significant role in weakening China's bargain-
ing position at Aigun. 123 
The boundaries set forth in the Treaty of Aigun included a new frontier at 
the source of the Ussuri where it intersects the Amur River. Under the terms 
of the agreement, both nations would administer the territory lying east of the 
U ssuri. l24 For these rather generous territorial concessions the Chinese were 
permitted to maintain their sovereignty over the sixty-four settlements built by 
the Manchus east of the Amur. 125 The Chinese later refused to ratify the 
119. With the outbreak of the Crimean War, Russian fears of British or French landings on 
the eastern Siberian coast had prompted a move by the Tsar to acquire the border territories. AN, 
supra note 1, at 32, 34. In 1854, 1855, and 1856 Russia sent expeditions down the Amur River to 
establish Russian fortifications in direct violation of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 23, at 47, 48. The Treaty of Aigun effectively nullified the territorial provisions established 
by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, granting the land to China in 1689. Treaty of Amity and Limits 
(Treaty of Aigun), May 16, 1858, Russia-China, art. I, [1908J 1 H.C.T. 454, [1969J 118 Parry's 
T.S. 493; Treaty of Nerchinsk, supra note 104, art. I, [1908]1 H.C.T. 437, [1969J 18 Parry's 
T.S. 503. See Appendix. 
120. Governor General of Siberia since 1847. 
121. H.F. MACNAIR & D. F. LACH, MODERN FAR EASTERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
52-53 (1955); D. D,\LLIN, THE RISE OF RUSSIA IN ASIA 20 (1949); WEIGH, supra note 108, at 
36-37. 
122. Realizing that acquiesence to the terms of the Treaty of Aigun would be viewed as 
capitulation to Tsarist strength, the Chinese chose to conclude the Treaty at Aigun rather than 
Peking. Su AN, supra note I, at 36. 
123. /d. 
124. Treaty of Aigun, supra note 119, art. I, [1908]1 H.C.T. 454, [1969]118 Parry's T.S. 
493. One of the few objectives that the Tsarist representatives failed to achieve at Aigun was ex-
clusive Russian control over the 150,000 square miles of territory running along the Ussuri River 
to Korea. AN, supra note I, at 36. 
125. Treaty of Aigun, supra note 119, art. I, [1908J 1 H.C.T. 454, [1969]118 Parry's T.S. 
493. 
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Aigun Treaty (in 1859), although in 1860 General Nikolai Ignatiev obtained 
China's assent to the Treaty of Peking. The treaty of Peking was even more 
pro-Russian than the Treaty negotiated at Aigun in 1858. 126 
In both procedural and substantive terms the Treaty of Aigun arguably falls 
within the unequal treaties doctrine. When the negotiations commenced in 
Aigun, the Russians enjoyed the same military advantage that the Chinese 
had enjoyed at Nerchinsk in 1689. Supported by 20,000 soldiers, Muraviev 
demanded and received all territory north of the banks of the Amur River, 
totalling approximately 185,000 square miles.127 The only provision that can 
arguably be viewed as a Russian concession is the Tsar's willingness to allow 
China to retain jurisdiction over the sixty-four Amur River settlements. 128 
The Treaty of Aigun was imposed on the decaying Manchu dynasty through 
sheer force, presumably meeting both Russian and Chinese criteria for ap-
plication of the unequal treaties doctrine. The overwhelming lack of substan-
tive reciprocity further supports the characterization of the Treaty as unequal 
under the doctrine. 
4. The Treaty of Peking 
The Treaty of Peking was concluded in November 1860 under rather 
unique circumstances. Disagreements between the French and British and the 
Chinese government over the Treaties of Tientsin (1858) had degenerated in-
to violence, eventually resulting in the Anglo-French occupation of Tientsin 
and Peking. 129 Confronted with the destruction and desecration of the Royal 
Palace and ajoint Anglo-French force of 17,000, the Manchu emperor Hsien-
feng fled Peking, thus effectively transferring responsibility for foreign policy 
to the 28 year old Prince Kung. The treaties signed by the British, French, 
and Russians exacted even greater concessions and indemnities than the 
Western powers had initially sought to obtain. 130 
The Treaty of Peking supplanted the earlier boundaries set by the Treaties 
of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta (1727), confirming the cessation of territory 
to Russia through the Treaty of Aigun (1858).131 Additionally, 133,000 square 
126. LAMB, supra note 21, at 207. 
127. Treaty of Aigun, supra note 119, art. I, [1908)1 H.C.T. 454, [1969)118 Parry's T.S. 
493; SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 48. 
128. Treaty of Aigun, supra note 119, art. I, [1908)1 H.C.T. 454, [1969)118 Parry's T.S. 
493. 
129. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 50. 
130. O.E. CLUBB, CHINA AND RUSSIA 88 (1971). The unilaterally pro-Russian provisions of 
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Peking were at least in part a reward for General Nikolai Ignatiev's role 
as an "honest broker" between the powerful British forces and the crumbling Manchu Dynasty. 
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 50, 51. 
131. Additional Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Limits (Treaty of Peking), Nov. 
2,1860, Russia-China, art. I, [1908)1 H.C.T. 462, [1969)123 Parry's T.S. 125. See Appendix. 
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miles of land east of the Ussuri River's banks, formerly under joint ad-
ministration by virtue of Article I of the Treaty of Aigun, became part of Im-
perial Russia.132 The eastern frontier was partially delineated by the U ssuri 
and Sungacha Rivers, running across lake Hinkai (Khanka), then south to the 
Korean border, where it terminated in the Tumen River. 133 Ironically, the 
Treaty of Peking failed even to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty over the 
sixty-four outposts on the north bank of the Amur, which was the sole pro-
Chinese provision of the Treaty of Aigun. 134 
The Treaty of Peking, in conjunction with the Aigun Treaty of 1858, has 
delimited the far-eastern Soviet border with Manchuria to the present. 135 The 
unilateral territorial concessions contained in the Treaty of Peking actually 
constituted part of General Nikolai Ignatiev's price for his role as an in-
termediary between the Manchu Emperor and the British army in China. 136 
Procedurally, the Treaty of Peking involved little of that which could be 
termed negotiation between sovereign equals. The terms were dictated by 
Russia with bribes and threats,137 and offered even less in return than the 
Treaty of Aigun. 138 There can be little argument with the assertion that the 
Treaty of Peking created extremely one-sided obligations and evidenced no 
substantive reciprocity. Assuming the validity of the previous characterization 
of the Treaty of Aigun as unequal, the procedural and substantive aspects of 
the Treaty of Peking would certainly justify application of the unequal treaties 
doctrine as interpreted by Soviet and Chinese jurists. 
V. POLEMICS 
A. The Chinese View oj the Treaties 
Governing the Far-Eastern Sino-Soviet Border 
It has been asserted that the sudden Chinese hostility concerning the "un-
equal treaties" governing the Sino-Soviet border is prompted by temporal and 
political considerations. However, it is evident that the Treaties of Aigun and 
132. !d. The territory east of the U ssuri River later became known as the Soviet Maritime 
Province. It should be noted that the Russians exacted even greater territorial concessions from 
the Manchus in Central Asia. In acquiescing to the Sinkiang - Russian Central Asian boundary 
the Chinese ceded nearly 350,000 square miles of land. Treaty of Peking, art. II, [1908] 1 
H.C.T. 463, [1969]123 Parry's T.S. 125. 
133. Treaty of Peking, art. I, [1908]1 H.C.T. 462, [1969]123 Parry's T.S. 125. 
134. LAMB, supra note 21, at 207. 
135. AN, supra note 1, at 38. 
136. Treaty of Peking, art. I, [1908] 1 H.C.T. 462, [1969] 123 Parry's T.S. 125. The Rus-
sians had already developed and established control over the Maritime Province, so the treaty 
provision was merely recognition of defacto sovereignty. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 51. 
137. 1 H. MORSE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 1834-1860, at 613 
(1910). 
138. As previously noted, the Treaty of Peking ignores Chinese jurisdiction over the sixty-four 
settlements on the north bank of the Amur which had been granted in Article I of the Treaty of 
Aillun. See not" 125 mfJra and accompanying text. 
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Peking satisfy the socialist criteria for unilateral abrogation under the unequal 
treaties doctrine. 139 The first official Communist Chinese accusation 140 con-
cerning the inequality of the treaties governing the Manchurian border came 
on March 8, 1963. The Treaties of Aigun and Peking were listed in aJen-min 
jih-pao (People's Daily) editorial as among those that China considered as 
"unequal. "141 While declaring Chinese intentions of recovering some 60,000 
square miles of Central Asia and Siberia taken by Imperial Russia from Man-
chu China, the editorial indicated Peking's willingness to maintain the status 
quo until negotiations could be arranged. 142 
The revised editions of Chinese maps published in 1964 raised a number of 
questions concerning the status of the current Sino-Soviet frontier. Despite the 
announcement of a border settlement between the two nations in 1962, the 
Map oj the Chinese People's Republic143 listed as "undetermined" the entire 
border with the Mongolian People's Republic. The far-eastern and central-
asian boundaries were also left undefined by this map.l44 This was followed in 
the same year by the publication of a revised edition of the Concise Geography oj 
China 145 which did delineate the Mongolian frontier. The northeastern, Amur 
and U ssuri border regions remained undefined. Other maps given to Euro-
peans by Chinese officials several years later included the land ceded through 
the "unequal treaties" as Chinese territory.146 The foreign minister of the 
People's Republic of China, Chen Yi, noted in a May 20, 1966 statement that 
the Soviets currently occupied approximately 830,000 square miles of Chinese 
territory by virtue of the unequal treaties. 147 Nonetheless, a 1979 map of the 
People's Republic of China fixed the far-eastern border according to the 
Treaties of Aigun and Peking .148 
139. CHINESE TREATIES, supra note 69, at 97. See Appendix. 
140. The Manchurian Treaties between the U.S.S.R. and China, including the 1945 and 
1950 Treaties regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, were the subject of discussion during 
Khrushchev's 1954 visit to Peking. See On Mao Tse-tung's Talk with a Group of Japanese Socialists, 
Pravda editorial, Sept. 2, 1964, translated in INT'L AFF., Oct. 1964. See also The Old Democratic 
Revolutionary Era (1840-1919) - Chinese Territories Taken by Imperialism (map), in CHUNG-KUOCHIN-
TAl CHIEN-SHIH (A Short History of Modern China) 253 (Liu P.-H. ed. 1954), reprinted in 
DOOLIN, supra note 102, at 17. 
141. A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party !if the U.S.A., j.M.j.P. Mar. 8, 1963, 
translated in PEKING REV., Mar. 15, 1963, at 58. This People's Daily editorial cited the following 
as unequal treaties: the Treaty of Nanking (1842), Aigun (1858), Tientsin (1858), Peking (1860), 
IIi (1861), the Protocol of Lisbon (1887), Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), and the Convention on 
the Extension of Hong Kong (1898). 
142. AN, supra note 1, at 14. 
143. MAP OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (3d rev. ed. 1964), cited in WATSON, supra note 
11, at 188. 
144. /d. 
145. See WATSON, supra note 11, at 189. 
146. THE ASIAN STUDENT, April 12, 1969, at 2, cited in AN, supra note 1, at 102. 
147. Radio Free Europe, Research Report: The Border Issue Reappears 1, 2 (June 3, 1966). 
148. See the map of the P.R.C. in China's National Minorities: Chinese National Minorities and 
Major Areas !if Distribution, BEIJING REV., Feb. 9, 1979, at 17, 19. A number of recent maps accom-
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The official Chinese position is that the unequal treaties permitted illegal 
annexations of territory. 149 Although Peking has indicated its acceptance of 
the present boundaries on an interim basis, 150 the Chinese clearly consider the 
current treaties as an insufficient and illegal foundation for a permanent settle-
ment of the far-eastern border dispute. 151 Notably, China's claims have been 
based on substantive factors, placing less reliance on the Karakhan Declara-
tion and other Soviet admissions of inequality. 152 Although the People's 
Republic of China has expressed some flexibility regarding the substance of 
renegotiation, Peking has continued to press for a Soviet admission of the in-
equality of the present border treaties. 153 To some extent, this requires that the 
Soviet Union accord the People's Republic of China respect as a relative equal 
through the negotiation process. 154 
B. The Soviet View of the Treaties Governing 
the Far-Eastern Sino-Soviet Border 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 was followed by a general renunciation of 
all territories ceded to the Tsarist government under duress. Although the 
Karakhan Declaration of July 25, 1919 indicated that the new regime viewed 
previous treaties as products of imperialism, 155 the Soviet government made 
panying magazine articles of general interest also have followed the treaty border. See, e.g., maps 
in Yangtze Waters Diverted to North China, PEKING REV., Sept. 22, 1978, at 6; How to Get High Yields 
in Agriculture, id., Sept. 29, 1978, at 18. 
149. During the 1964 Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations "[the] Chinese side made clear that 
the 'Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigun', the 'Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking', and other treaties 
relating to the present Sino-Soviet boundary were all unequal treaties Czarist Russian im-
perialism imposed on China when power was not in the hands of the people of China and 
Russia." Chenpao Island, supra note 103, at 15. 
150. This was the position taken at the border talks between November 1963 and March 1964. 
WATSON. supra note 11, at 178-79. 
151. AN, supra note 1, at 114. 
152. Chenpao Island, supra note 103, at 14, 15. 
153. See, e.g., Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: 
Refutation of the Soviet Government's Statement of June 3, 1969 (Oct. 8, 1969), reprinted in 
P.R.C., STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 10 (1969); 
Chenpao Island, supra note 103, at 14, 15. 
154. Leng, The Sino-Soviet Dispute, in LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 274 (S.C. Leng & H. 
Chiu eds. 1972). 
155. Through the Declaration of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.F,S.R. to the 
Chinese Nation and the Governments of Southern and Northern China of July 25, 1919, the 
Soviet Government "renounced all the conquests made by the Tsarist government in depriving 
China of Manchuria and other areas," 2 DOKUMENTY VNESHNEI POLITIKI S.S.R. (Documents of 
the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.) 213-16 (1958), cited in Ginsburgs & Pinkele, The Genesis of the 
Territorial Issue in the Sino-Soviet Dialogue: Substantive Dispute or Ideological Pas de Deux?, in CHINA'S 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW a.A. Cohen ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Ginsburgs & 
Pinkele]. The Karakhan Declaration (Note from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of 
the R.F.S.R. to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China), dated Sept. 27, 1920 stated: 
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no substantial effort toward restoration of the previous borders. 156 In 1924, the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China signed the "Agreement on 
the General Principles for the Settlement of Questions between the People's 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union. "157 Through this document the 
Soviet Union specifically renounced extraterritoriality in China. The Chinese 
position since 1924 has been that the 1924 Agreement mandates a renegotia-
tion of all of the treaties concluded between the Tsarist government and 
China.158 However, Moscow has steadfastly maintained that the Agreement 
did not include boundary treaties. 159 According to Soviet legal professor 
Grigorii Tunkin, the only unequal treaties of the Tsarist governmentl60 were 
abrogated by the Soviet Union. 161 The Soviets assert that the Manchurian 
border is the product of historical development, thus requiring that the nine-
teenth century treaties be respected .162 
the government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics declares without 
force all trel\ties concluded by the former government of Russia and China, renounces 
all seizures of Chinese territory, all Russian concessions in China, and returns to China 
without compensation and forever all that was rapaciously seized from her by the 
government of the Russian bourgeoisie. 
3 DOKUMENTY VNESHNEI POLITIKI S.S.R. 213-16 (1959), cited in Ginsburgs & Pinkele, supra, at 
195. 
156. WATSON, supra note 11, at 51; STEPHENSON, supra note 24, at 414. 
157. May 31, 1924, U.S.S.R. - China, [1925] 37 L.N.T.S. 176. 
158. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, PEKING REV., May 30, 1969, at 3, 
6. 
159. Leng, The Sino-Soviet Dispute, in LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 268, 271 (S. C. Leng & 
H. Chiu eds. 1972). V. Khvostov argues that the 1924 Agreement refers to the unequal treaties 
between China and Japan (e.g., the Treaty of Shimonoseki, (1896» V. KHVOSTOV, 
MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN (1964), cited in JACKSON, supra note 10, at 119, 120. There are indi-
cations that the Chinese may have agreed initially with the Soviet Union on this point. For exam-
ple, Tseng Yu-hao, a highly respected jurist, fails even to mention the Sino-Soviet border treaties 
in his discussion of the 1924 Agreement. TSENG Y.-H., THE TERMINATION OF UNEQUAL 
TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1933). 
160. I. e., the treaties concerning consular jurisdiction and spheres of influence: 
161. G. Tunkin, (U.S.S.R.) Sixth (Legal) Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. AlC.6/SR717/15 at 137 (1961), cited in Erickson, supra note 49, at 79. O. Ivanov contends 
that "it is common knowledge that the Soviet state abrogated all the unequal treaties which the 
tsarist government either independently or jointly with other imperalist powers had imposed on 
China." O. IVANOV, SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS SURVEYED 34-35 (1975). Professor Tunkin 
has also recounted the repudiation of unequal treaties with Japan, Persia, and Turkey following 
the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 11-14. 
162. By resorting to the method of "historical references" in the question of borders, one 
can prove anything. One can prove, for instance, that England is a French territory 
because she was once the possession of a Duke of Normandy .... The territories to the 
north of the Khingans were populated by indigenous tribes (the Evenks, Daurs, etc.) 
which from time to time were subjected to raids by the Manchus and paid them tribute. 
There was no indigenous Manchu or Chinese population in the Amur area. With 
Russia developing the northern half of the Amur Basin and China the southern, there 
began the process of delineating the factual border. It was formalised more than one 
hundred years ago in the Aigun and Peking Treaties. 
On Mao Tse-tung's Talk with a Group of Japanese Socialists, Pravda editorial, Sept .. 2, 1964, at 2, 
translated in INT'LAFF., Oct. 1964, at 80-85, reprinted in 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 66, at 448. 
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In a September 15, 1964 discussion with a Japanese parliamentary delega-
tion, Nikita Khrushchev stated that the Soviet government would not defend 
Tsarist foreign policy: "They, like other emperors, were plunderers, they 
waged predatory wars and strove to seize other's property and increase their 
own holdings ... but what were the Chinese emperors engaged in? In the 
same wars of conquest, the same plunder as the tsars of Russia."163 Soviet 
jurist Fedor Kozhevnikov has charged that the Chinese arguments violate the 
basic international legal principles of territorial sovereignty and observance of 
voluntary international obligations: "It is known that no territorial questions 
exist between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. and that the Soviet-Chinese fron-
tier has taken shape historically." 164 The Soviet Union has expressed great 
dissatisfaction with Peking's preliminary conditions for resumption of border 
negotiations. 165 A Diplomatic Note from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, issued March 26, 1978 in reply to the Message from the Presidium of the 
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to the Standing Committee of the Chinese National 
People's Congress of February 24, 1978, stated that continued negotiations 
would require: 1) Soviet recognition of the' 'disputed areas" along the border; 
2) a pull-back of Soviet forces on the frontier; and 3) an agreement on the 
maintenance of the status quo in this area. 166 
It was noted in Pravda, the official Soviet newspaper, that the territorial 
boundaries found on Chinese maps have no juridical validity: 
It is important to emphasize here that the border lines appearing on 
Chinese maps in the so-called "disputed areas" have no juridical 
foundation whatsoever and that they do not coincide with the lines 
fixed by the Russian-Chinese treaty documents. It is no accident 
that, in substantiating its drawing of the border line, Peking refuses 
to consider the treaty documents that are the only juridical basis for 
the existing border .... By striving for the recognition of "disputed 
areas," Peking hopes to overturn the legal treaty basis of the existing 
border. 167 
163. Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's Talk with a Japanese Parliamentary Delegation, Pravda, Sept. 15, 
1964, translated in C.D.S.P., Oct. 14, 1964, at 4; see also Statement of the USSR Government, Pravda, 
June 14, 1969, translated in C.D.S.P., July 9, 1969, at 1, 12. 
164. Tass, International Service Dispatch, Moscow, April 8, 1964, translated in DOOLIN, supra 
note 102, at 39. 
165. Reality and Fabrications - On the Question of a Soviet-Chinese Border Settlement, Pravda editorial, 
April 1, 1978, at 4-5, translated in C.D.S.P., April 26, 1978, at 1. 
166. Real Deeds, Yes; Hollow Statements, No!, J.M.J.P., Mar. 26, 1978, translated in PEKING 
REV., Mar. 31, 1978, at 14, 15; Reality and Fabrications - On the Question of a Soviet-Chinese Border Set-
tlement, Pravda editorial, April 1 , 1978, at 4-5, translated in C.D.S.P., April 26, 1978, at 1. See note 
8 supra. 
167. Reality and Fabrications - On the Question of a Soveit-Chinese Border Settlement, Pravda editorial, 
April 1, 1978, at 4-5, translated in C.D.S.P., April 26, 1978, at 1, 3. 
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VI. PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION 
There is little doubt that the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute over the far-
eastern border constitutes but a small portion of a greater ideological 
divergence between the two communist superpowers. 16S Therefore, any 
resolution of the frontier situation would depend heavily on political factors. It 
does appear that, if removed from the currently highly-charged political 
arena, the prospects for resolving the unequal border treaties problem would 
be favorable.1 69 Presently, however, the sporadic negotiations concerning the 
Manchurian frontier have resulted in no apparent progress. There are indica-
tions that Peking is willing to accept the "unequal" treaties as the basis for a 
renegotiation of the Sino-Soviet border.17O The People's Republic of China 
has asserted that boundary questions "can be settled through negotiation be-
tween the two governments . . . pending such a settlement the status quo 
should be maintained." 171 In 1957 Premier Chou En-Iai indicated that China 
would be willing to recognize the continued force of the pre-revolutionary 
boundary agreements between China and Imperial Russia, noting that 
"demands made on the basis of formal treaties should be respected according 
to general international practice. "172 
It could also be argued that the Chinese government has displayed good 
faith and a willingness to compromise in addressing the substantive issues. In 
two statements issued in October 1969, China relinquished its claims to ap-
proximately 600,000 square miles of territory173 ceded to Russia through the 
unequal treaties. 174 Perhaps China's willingness to compromise in the border 
168. E.g., the first public denunciation of the border treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking 
(1860) came only after serious differences had developed between the two nations. A Comment on 
the Statement of the Communist Party of the U. S.A., J .M.J .P., Mar. 8, 1963, translated in PEKING REV., 
Mar. 15, 1963, at 1,61; seeA. ULAM, EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 
1917-1973, at 682-85 (2d ed. 1974). 
169. Professor Terrill contends that although the Sino-Soviet border dispute was not the cause 
of the Sino-Soviet split, the border issue has become an integral part of the current divergence. 
Terrill predicts that if Soviet and Chinese interests coincide at some point in the future, the 
border issue will be expeditiously resolved. R. TERRILL, THE FUTURE OF CHINA 214 (1978). For 
an alternative view, see H. SALISBURY, WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA (1969). 
170. Compare the Chinese willingness to utilize the prior treaties between the Chinese and 
Russian Empires as a basis for renegotiation with the principle of uti possidetis de jure. This rule of 
regional international law (not applicable as customary international law), generally accepted by 
Latin American states, establishes present Latin American borders congruent with the ad-
ministrative boundaries of the Spanish Colonial Empire. For an illustration of uti possidetis dejure, 
see St. John, The Boundary Dispute Between Peru and Ecuador, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 322, 323 (1977). 
171. A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., J.M.J.P., Mar. 8, 1963, 
translated in PEKING REV., Mar. 15, 1963, at 61. 
172. Report on the Question of the Boundary Line between China and Burma to the Fourth 
Session of the First National People's Congress, translated in CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, A VICTORY FOR THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 19, 33 
(1960). 
173. AN, supra note 1, at 113-14. 
174. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (Oct. 7, 1969) reprinted in 
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dispute can be observed best through Peking's past record in renegotiations. 
On the less politicized frontiers, the Chinese have displayed seemingly great 
concern for substantive and procedural equality.175 In each instance, China 
has agreed to maintain nearly traditional boundaries. This may be due to 
China's historically superior position to these nations. The Soviets, however, 
may find themselves ideologically ( or politically) unable to negotiate with 
China as a superpower of equal stature. 176 In certain instances, Peking has 
foregone legal technicalities and opted for flexibility in border negotiations. 
The Sino-Nepalese boundary discussions produced a frontier remarkably 
similar to the border set forth in the previously unacceptable treaty.177 It ap-
pears that China readily accepted established historical facts and merely 
sought to lend the agreement legitimacy through renegotiation on the basis of 
equality. Since the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet government has been 
placed in the uncomfortable position of defending clearly imperialistic treaties 
with China. I 78 The one-sidedness of the treaties is justified in the Soviet view 
by the fact that Imperial China was also an exploitive empire with no greater 
claim to legitimacy. 179 In the case of the far-eastern frontier, this argument is 
at least partially supported by the examination of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. 180 
P.R.C., STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 4, 5 (1969); 
Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: Refutation of the 
Soviet Government's Statement of June 3, 1969 (Oct. 8, 1969), reprinted in P.R.C., STATEMENT 
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 10 (1969). In 1976 the Soviet Union 
verified that although the Chinese declare the border treaties invalid, Peking had not asked for 
the return of the 580,000 square miles of territory ceded to Russia. The main dispute concerned 
the 12,700 square miles appropriated by Imperial Russia beyond the actual treaties. 
175. E.g., the Nepal, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan boundary negotiations. There are 
also indications that China and India are renewing efforts to resolve the Sino-Indian border 
dispute. See Sino-Indian Relations, BEIJING REV., Feb. 23, 1979, at 3,4. 
176. Ginsburgs & Pinkele, supra note 155, at 204. 
177. /d. at 203. China's historical commitment to State sovereignty is reflected even in the 
Chine_e language. The Chinese word for "country," "kuo-chia," refers to the exercise of 
governmental rule within territorial boundaries. H. F. SCHURMANN, THE LOGIC OF WORLD 
POWER 357 (1974). Soviet international legal theory has also evolved with a continuing emphasis 
on sovereignty. Quigley, The New Soviet Approach to International Law, 7 HARV. INT'L L. J. I, 22-25 
(1965); see also TRISKA & SLUSSER, supra note 56, at 84. 
178. It should be recalled that the Soviet unequal treaties doctrine developed at least partially 
as a response to the new Soviet Government's need to avoid Tsarist treaty obligations. 
ERICKSON, supra note 49, at 79. Note that the problem of State succession does not occur in the 
case of border treaties specifically delimiting a boundary. In these cases, "what is inherited is not 
the treaty but the territorial extent of sovereignty." 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN 
MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 273 (1967). In the case of the Sino-Indian border 
dispute, only a traditional frontier existed and China asserted that both nations must therefore 
formally negotiate a treaty. /d. at 277. The 1961 Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty resolved a 
similar situation. /d. at 281. See generally O. UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES TO INTERNA-
TIONAl. TREATIES 380 (1972). Professor Tunkin states that the Soviet Union has always opposed 
the doctrine of State succession and unequal treaties as reactionary elements of customary inter· 
national law. THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 32. 
179. WATSON, supra note 11, at 178-9. 
180. See § IV. B. 1 supra. 
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It is possible that the Soviet Union's refusal to acknowledge the inequality of 
prior treaties stems from a fear of encouraging similar claims by the Soviet 
Union's other neighbors. 181 
Beyond the characteristic propaganda of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Moscow 
has indicated an interest in resolving the far-eastern boundary issue without 
loss of face. At least one writer has asserted that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to 
surrender its claim to the U ssuri River Islands if necessary to obtain a Chinese 
acknowledgment of the present frontier in the 1964 and 1969 border talks be-
tween the two nations. 182 The Soviets have also displayed a sustained interest 
in the resumption of border talks. 183 On November 27, 1977, border negotia-
tions resumed in Peking between Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid 1. Lyichev 
and Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Chan for the first time since 1975. 184 The 
Soviet Union has consistently maintained that the Sino-Soviet border treaties 
cannot be considered "unequal" and do not fall within the unequal treaties 
doctrine. This may stem from Moscow's fear of the consequences of a 
breakdown in negotiations after conceding the invalidity of the current bound-
ary. 185 Throughout the dispute both the Soviets and the Chinese have invoked 
international law to bolster their respective arguments. However, political 
considerations have clearly controlled the selective application of the unequal 
treaties doctrine. 186 Somewhat ironically, the Soviet Union's present position 
in effect strongly resembles the reaction of customary international legal 
theorists to the development of the unequal treaties doctrine. 187 The continu-
ing bitter polemics emanating from Moscow and Peking seem to indicate that 
no reasonable discussion of substantive issues is likely to occur under present 
political circumstances. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although classical Western international legal theorists have used the term 
"unequal treaties," the Western concept bears little resemblance to the un-
equal treaties doctrine advanced by Soviet and Chinese jurists. 188 The Soviet 
concept developed largely as an alternative to the customary doctrines and 
allowed abrogation of treaties concluded by the Tsarist regime. The unique 
Chinese experience, including extraterritoriality and spheres of influence, 
181. AN, supra note 1, at 117. 
182. Ginsburgs, The Dynamics of the Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute: The Case of the River Islands, in 
THE DYNAMICS OF CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 16 (I.A. Cohen ed., 1970) [hereinafter cited as 
Ginsburgs]. 
183. See, e.g., Message from the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to the Standing 
Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress (Feb. 24, 1978), reprinted in PEKING REV., 
Mar. 31, 1978, at 18. 
184. R. TERRILL, THE FUTURE OF CHINA 210 (1978). 
185. Ginsburgs, supra note 182, at 17. 
186. HSIUNG, supra note 49, at 274. 
187. See notes 38, 48, 71 supra. 
188. See § III. A, B supra. 
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prompted the evolution of a slightly different concept of unequal treaties. Both 
Soviet and Chinese writers agree that procedural factors surrounding the 
negotiation of a treaty are significant in the determination of its characteriza-
tion. Jurists of both nations have also placed a great deal of emphasis on the 
substantive equality of treaty provisions and on reciprocity of obligations. 
Similarly, both Chinese and Soviet legal scholars have indicated that inequal-
ity renders a treaty void ab initio. Thus, unequal treaties are not protected by 
pacta sunt servanda and cannot be enforced by the signatories. An examination 
of the four major treaties governing the Manchurian Sino-Soviet border 
elucidates the basis for application of the unequal treaties doctrine. There ap-
pears to be a great deal of historical support for Peking's characterization of 
the Treaties of Aigun and Peking as unequal treaties under both the Chinese 
and the Soviet doctrines. Since these are the two major treaties delimiting the 
present border, Chinese demands for renegotiation have a legitimate basis 
under both Soviet and Chinese articulations of the unequal treaties concept. 
There is also adequate support for the Soviet rejoinder that Imperial China 
failed to observe the rule of equality in prior border treaties. The Treaty of 
Nerchinsk can be characterized as procedurally unequal in favor of the 
Chinese, although this treaty was largely superceded by the subsequent ac-
cords regarding the far-eastern Sino-Soviet frontier. 
The Soviets have answered Chinese charges that the Treaties of Aigun and 
Peking are unequal with the assertion that the present frontier is an historical 
fact. Peking appears to have actually accepted this view in its tacit agreement 
to honor the current treaties until new ones are renegotiated on the basis of the 
existing boundary. The price demanded by the Chinese for this concession is 
Soviet admission that the Treaties of Aigun and Peking are unequal. Peking 
has not chosen to unilaterally abrogate these treaties, although both the 
Chinese and Soviet unequal treaties doctrine would arguably render the 
treaties void and without force. The fact that Sino-Soviet relations have stead-
ily deteriorated over the past two decades has not enhanced opportunities to 
resolve differences over the Manchurian border. 189 Tension between the two 
powers in world affairs has left little room for either side to compromise 
without loss offace or territory. If, however, the highly-politicized atmosphere 
of the past decade abates, the differences over the far-eastern Sino-Soviet fron-
tier may be resolved through recognition of the present frontier in a new 
"equal" treaty. 
Jesse A. Finkelstein 
189. A further decline in Sino-Soviet relations was signalled by the April 3, 1979 decision of 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the P.R.C. not to extend the 1950 
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, Feb. 14, 1950, [1950] 226 U .N.T.S. 3, 
beyond its expiration date of April 11, 1980. Statement of the New China News Agency (April 3, 
1979), translated in Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty Will Not Be Extended, BEIJING REV., April 6, 1979, at 





THE SINO-SOVIET BOUNDARY 
Boundary defined by Treaty of NeTchinsk, 1689 
Boundary defined by Treaty of Kiakhta, 1727 
Boundary defined by Treaty of Aigun, 1858 
3a Territory ceded to Russia in 1858 
4 Boundary defined by Treaty of Peking, 1860 
4a Territory ceded to Russia in 1860 
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